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American courts confront questions of religious law in family disputes
and other cases involving matters such as contracts, torts, or the use of
private arbitration tribunals for dispute resolution. In each of these areas,
secular courts must endeavor to strike a constitutional balance between free
exercise and establishment concerns when disputants present their
controversies, claims, or evidence to the court. Adherents of religious law
face the corresponding challenge of determining how and when to invoke
secular legal authority in their private disputes. But religious family law
practices provoke particularly intense and polarized debate in the United
States and other nations.
For the most part, we consider family matters to be located within a
zone of privacy, unless there are harms to family members that the state
must address.1 Individuals may choose to govern their lives through norms
of religious law, even when these have no secular legal effect.2 For those
public rights and obligations that depend on personal or family status,

* Prepared for the Association of American Law Schools’ Sections on Islamic Law and Jewish
Law Joint Program on “Islamic and Jewish Law in the 21st Century: Contemporary Philosophical
and Legal Challenges to Religious Law,” January 5, 2014.
1. On marital privacy, see for example Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
2. See Ann Laquer Estin, Unofficial Family Law, 94 IOWA L. REV. 449 (2009); see also JULIE
MACFARLANE, ISLAMIC DIVORCE IN NORTH AMERICA: A SHARI’A PATH IN A SECULAR SOCIETY
(2012) (discussing use of parallel civil and religious divorce procedures). For a notable decision
affirming this practice, see Brown v. Buhman, 947 F. Supp. 2d 1170 (D. Utah 2013).
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however, the state maintains a monopoly over the legal definition of spousal
or parent-child relationships. In this public sphere, questions of marriage
validity, divorce recognition and parentage determination become important
for purposes of criminal law, creditor’s rights, bankruptcy, income tax,
inheritance, Social Security benefits, immigration and many other subjects.
As a family law scholar, I believe that the goals of secular and religious
family law are often harmonious, and I have argued for a legal pluralism in
the United States that is subject to the constraints of our fundamental
“political and constitutional values, [including principles] of equality,
nondiscrimination, [due process,] and religious freedom . . . as well as the
protective policies that form the foundation for our particular rules of family
law.”3 This vision of pluralism seeks to accommodate diverse cultural and
religious traditions within our secular legal system, and rejects an approach
in which autonomous religious institutions exercise independent authority
This approach “reflects a contemporary
over family law matters.4
understanding of our society as a diverse and multicultural one, and of the
family as central to the establishment of identity and meaning in private
life.”5 My writing has explored the process in which common law courts
adjudicating these cases have begun to develop principles defining the terms
and limits for accommodation of religious family practices,6 and I have
followed with interest as many judges and scholars in the United States and
other countries have made thoughtful contributions to this dialogue.7
The debate over multicultural accommodation and fundamental values
has taken a new direction since 2010, with the enactment of legislation in
several states designed to constrain the process through which courts

3. See, e.g., Ann Laquer Estin, Embracing Tradition: Pluralism in American Family Law, 63
MD. L. REV. 540, 541 (2004). It would also be subject to constraints of criminal law and the public
child welfare system. See id. at 568 n. 169.
4. On the definitional and membership problems associated with formal legal pluralism, see
Ann Laquer Estin, Family Law, Pluralism, and Human Rights, 25 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 811, 824-27
(2011).
5. Embracing Tradition, supra note 3, at 541.
6. In addition to the other articles previously cited, see also The Multi-Cultural Family (Ann
Laquer Estin, ed. 2008), Ann Laquer Estin, Toward a Multicultural Family Law, 38 FAM. L.Q. 501
(2004)
7. See The Multi-Cultural Family, supra note 6, see also MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE IN A
MULTICULTURAL CONTEXT: MULTI-TIERED MARRIAGE AND THE BOUNDARIES OF CIVIL LAW AND
RELIGION (Joel A. Nichols, ed. 2012).
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evaluate relevant principles of religious law.8 At the outset, these proposals
were framed to prohibit any consideration of Sharia law, until the federal
courts ruled that the Oklahoma ballot initiative taking this approach violated
the Establishment Clause.9 More recent statutes apply more broadly to any
“foreign law,”10 and seek to control state courts’ consideration of “foreign
law” by two techniques: (1) restricting the use of traditional common law
principles of comity and forum non conveniens,11 and (2) limiting the
enforcement of contractual choice of law and forum selection agreements.12
In their campaign to enact these laws, the proponents have focused on
family law, tempering the sweeping language of their legislation with
exemptions for contracts entered into by corporations or other business
entities,13 or directing the new restrictions exclusively to family law.14 It is
not evident how or whether the new statutes will lead to different outcomes
in family disputes. The proponents pointed to examples of cases in which
state courts considered a claim or evidence based on religious law or
practice,15 but the same examples suggest that courts were able to handle
these issues appropriately.16 There is reason for concern, however, that the

8. An argument for this type of legislation is advanced by Shariah Law and American State
Courts: An Assessment of State Appellate Court Cases, CTR. FOR SEC. POLICY (May 20, 2011),
available at http://shariahinamericancourts.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/06/Sharia_Law_And_
American_State_Courts_1.4_06212011.pdf; see also Andrea Elliott, The Man Behind the AntiShariah Movement, N.Y. TIMES (July 30, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/31/
us/31shariah.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0. For arguments against enactment of this legislation, see
Faiza Patel et al., CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS, Foreign Law Bans: Legal Uncertainties and Practical
Problems (May 23, 2013), available at http://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/
publications/ForeignLawBans.pdf; Salli A. Swartz, ABA, Resolution and Report 113A (Aug. 8–9,
2011), available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/directories/policy/2011_am_
113a.authcheckdam.pdf.
9. See Awad v. Ziriax, 670 F.3d 1111 (10th Cir. 2012).
10. Accord KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-5102 (West, Westlaw through 2013 Sess.); TENN. CODE
ANN. § 20-15-101 (LEXIS through 2013 First Reg. Sess.).
11. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 60-5103, 60-5105(b) (West, Westlaw through 2013 Sess.).
12. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 60-5104, 60-5105(a) (West, Westlaw through 2013 Sess.).
13. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-5108 (West, Westlaw through 2013 Sess.); TENN. CODE
ANN. § 20-15-105 (LEXIS through 2013 First Reg. Sess.).
14. Patel et al., supra note 8, at 5–6, 28–29, 50 n.19, 56 n.158; see, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 187.14 (LEXIS through 2013 Sess.).
15. See Shariah Law and American State Courts, supra note 8, at 29–42 (listing “Top 20
Cases”).
16. See Patel et al., supra note 8, at 6–7 (rebutting the argument related to the “Top 20” cases).
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more extreme form of these statutes will do serious harm to the ordinary
practices of international comity in transnational family law cases.17
In some formulations—as enacted in states such as Arizona, Louisiana,
North Carolina, and Tennessee—the new foreign law statutes seem designed
to reaffirm the well-established principle that courts may not enforce a
foreign law “if doing so would violate a right guaranteed by the [state or
federal] Constitution . . . or conflict with the laws of the United States or this
state.”18 In states such as Kansas and Oklahoma, the statutory language is
much more sweeping. Kansas prohibits any ruling based,
in whole or in part on any foreign law, legal code or system that
would not grant the parties affected by the ruling or decision the
same fundamental liberties, rights and privileges granted under the
United States and Kansas constitutions, including, but not limited
to, equal protection, due process, free exercise of religion, freedom
of speech or press, and any right of privacy or marriage.19
This seems to require a broad comparative constitutional law inquiry, in
every choice of law or comity case, to determine whether the nation
concerned has protections that are identical to those in Kansas.20
With this essay, my goal is not to critique or interpret the new foreign
law statutes.21 Rather, I intend to trace the contours of comity and

17. See Ayelet Shachar, Faith in Law? Diffusing Tensions Between Diversity and Equality, in
MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE IN A MULTICULTURAL CONTEXT: MULTI-TIERED MARRIAGE AND THE
BOUNDARIES OF CIVIL LAW AND RELIGION, supra note 7, at 341, 346–49. There are also many
other reasons to object to these laws, including their potential to increase the vulnerability of some
family members in religious minority communities. See id.
18. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-3103 (Westlaw through First Special Sessions of the Fifty-first
Legis.); see La. REV. STAT. ANN. § 6001 (Westlaw through 2013 Sess.); see also N.C. Gen. Stat § 187.14 (LEXIS through 2013 Sess.); TENN. CODE ANN. § 20-15-102 (LEXIS through 2013 First Reg.
Sess.). For the principle that courts in the United States cannot recognize and enforce foreign
judgments that violate our public policy or due process norms, see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW section 482 (1987). On the interpretation problems that may arise under
these statutes, see Patel et al., supra note 8, at 15–24; see also Swartz, supra note 8, at 9–11 (arguing
that “existing law already provides adequate protections”).
19. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-5103 (West, Westlaw through 2013 Sess.); see also OKLA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 12, § 20(B) (West, Westlaw through 2013 Legis. Sess.) (same).
20. See Patel et al., supra note 8, at 15–17.
21. In addition to Patel et al., supra note 8, see generally Aaron Fellmeth, U.S. State Legislation
to Limit Use of International and Foreign Law, 106 AM. J. INT’L L. 107 (2012); Carlo A. Pedrioli,
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constitutional law more generally, noting the circumstances in which courts
deciding family law matters under ordinary comity or contract principles
might refuse to apply foreign or religious law, or to recognize and enforce a
judgment or arbitral award. From a constitutional perspective, the important
questions involve procedural and substantive protections for family rights
under the Due Process Clause, equality and nondiscrimination arguments
under the Equal Protection Clause, and religious freedom protected by the
Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses.
Constitutional doctrines provide the clearest possible threshold
definition of both due process and public policy, and provide a useful lens
for examining the types of concerns that courts might have in deciding these
cases. In my view, state courts have generally done a good job using
comity, contract, and the Constitution to manage cases involving foreign and
religious family law. The most difficult cases they face are problematic, not
because they reference foreign or religious law, but because they involve
transnational families with ongoing ties to multiple countries and legal
systems. This presents a conceptual problem, which is not clearly addressed
in these cases, regarding how we should define and understand the meaning
of membership in our broader legal and political community.
I. COMITY, CONTRACTS, AND DUE PROCESS
Most discussions of international comity in the United States begin with
Hilton v. Guyot,22 which suggested that foreign country court judgments
meeting basic requirements of reliability and fairness should be given legal
effect, but also that a court asked to extend comity has discretion in making
this determination.23 Contemporary formulations of the Hilton principle

Constructing the Other: U.S. Muslims, Anti-Sharia Law, and the Constitutional Consequences of
Volatile Intercultural Rhetoric, 22 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 65 (2012); Ryan H. Boyer, Comment,
“Unveiling” Kansas’s Ban on Application of Foreign Law, 61 U. KAN. L. REV. 1061 (2013); Sarah
M. Fallon, Note, Justice for All: American Muslims, Sharia Law, and Maintaining Comity Within
American Jurisprudence, 36 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 153 (2013); Bradford J. Kelley, Comment,
Bad Moon Rising: The Sharia Law Bans, 73 LA. L. REV. 601 (2013).
22. 159 U.S. 113 (1895).
23. See Joel R. Paul, Comity in International Law, 32 HARV. INT’L L.J. 1, 8–11 (1991).
Contemporary formulations of the comity principle follow this broad approach. See RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW §§ 481–82; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS
§ 98 (1971).
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enumerate similar requirements—including, whether “the judgment was
rendered [by] . . . a judicial system that . . . provide[s] impartial tribunals
[and] . . . procedures compatible with due process of law;” whether the
foreign court had an appropriate basis for exercising “jurisdiction over the
defendant;” and whether the defendant had notice and an opportunity for a
hearing.24 As part of the discretion accorded by the comity doctrine, states
may deny recognition to foreign judgments based on a “strong public
policy” that “would have precluded recovery” if the matter had been tried in
its own courts.25
State courts determining whether to extend comity to foreign judgments
in family law cases generally apply the same requirements developed in
interstate cases decided under the Due Process Clause or the Full Faith and
Credit Clause.26 These requirements primarily concern jurisdictional
grounds and the question of notice and an opportunity for a hearing.27
Similarly, in cases involving marital agreements concluded abroad, state
courts may apply their own laws to determine how and whether the
agreement should be enforced.28
For divorce, the rule in the United States is that jurisdiction must be
based on the residence or domicile of one of the parties in the forum state.29
This principle has a long history in the context of migratory interstate
divorces as well as international cases.30 Courts deny comity to a divorce
obtained abroad by a petitioner living with his or her spouse in the United
States, even if the foreign court had a basis for jurisdiction, such as

24. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 482.
25. Id.; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 98 cmt. g, 117 cmt. c.
26. See generally ANN LAQUER ESTIN, INTERNATIONAL FAMILY LAW DESK BOOK, 14–15
(2012) [hereafter ABA DESK BOOK] (discussing comity).
27. Id. at 6; see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 484 (Recognition
of Foreign Divorce Decrees); id. § 485 (Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Child Custody
Orders); id. § 486 (Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Support Orders). Courts may extend
comity to orders of foreign religious tribunals, but only if those orders have civil legal effect in the
country where they were issued. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW §§ 484–
86.
28. E.g., Shaban v. Shaban, 105 Cal. Rptr. 2d 863, 865 (Ct. App. 2001); Atassi v. Atassi, 451
S.E.2d 371, 373–74, 376 (N.C. Ct. App. 1995); see also ABA DESK BOOK, supra note 26, at 81–83.
29. See Ann Laquer Estin, Family Law Federalism: Divorce and the Constitution, 16 WM. &
MARY BILL RTS. J. 381, 385–86 (2007).
30. See id.

1034

[Vol. 41: 1029, 2014]

Foreign and Religious Family Law
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW

nationality, that was sufficient under its own law.31 Personal jurisdiction is
not required to litigate personal status matters in the United States—
including dissolution of marriage32 and termination of parental rights.33 It is
necessary for litigation of the financial aspects of divorce,34 however, and
also for establishing parentage and determining child support.35 This
practice has been described as divisible divorce jurisdiction. Courts apply
the same principles to international matters, both under the doctrine of
comity and the more specific formulations of statutes—such as the Uniform
Interstate Family Support Act (UIFSA) and the Uniform Child Custody
Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (UCCJEA).36 Constitutional due process
norms also require notice and an opportunity for a hearing in family law
cases even—or especially—when personal jurisdiction is not mandatory.37
Courts apply the same rule in international cases, denying comity to custody
and divorce orders entered by foreign tribunals that failed to provide the
respondent with notice and an opportunity for a hearing.38
In a significant group of cases, state courts have refused comity to
orders of foreign religious tribunals exercising official authority that was not
consistent with United States due process norms.39 Following the divisible

31. See, e.g., In re Ramadan, 891 A.2d 1186, 1190 (N.H. 2006), Farag v. Farag, 772 N.Y.S.2d
368, 371 (N.Y. App. Div. 2004); see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 484
(Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Divorce Decrees); see also ABA DESK BOOK, supra note
26, at 62 nn.87–89.
32. See Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 734–35 (1877); see also Williams v. North Carolina, 317
U.S. 287, 298–99 (1942).
33. See, e.g., Utah ex rel. W.A., 63 P.3d 607, 613–17 (Utah 2002); In re R.W., 39 A.3d 682, 693
(Vt. 2011); see also UNIF. CHILD CUSTODY JURISDICTION & ENFORCEMENT ACT (UCCJEA) §
201(c), 9 U.L.A. 23–24 (1997).
34. See Kulko v. Super. Ct. of Cal., 436 U.S. 84 (1978); Estin v. Estin, 334 U.S. 541 (1948).
35. See Kulko, 436 U.S. 84; see also UNIFORM INTERSTATE FAMILY SUPPORT ACT (UIFSA) §
201, 9 U.L.A. (Part 1B) 235 (1999 & Supp. 2012).
36. See ABA DESK BOOK, supra note 26, at 92–93 (financial aspects of divorce); id. at 145–53
(parental responsibilities); id. at 228–37 (child support). See generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 485 (Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Child Custody Orders)
(1987); id. § 486 (Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Support Orders).
37. See ABA DESK BOOK, supra note 26, at 6; see also Ann Laquer Estin, Global Child
Welfare: The Challenges for Family Law, 63 OKLA. L. REV. 691, 696–701 (2011).
38. E.g., Seewald v. Seewald, 22 P.3d 580, 584–85 (Colo. App. 2001); see ABA DESK BOOK,
supra note 26, at 62 nn.90–91.
39. E.g., Tal v. Tal, 601 N.Y.S.2d 530 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1993); Atassi v. Atassi, 451 S.E.2d 371
(N.C. Ct. App. 1995).

1035

[Vol. 41: 1029, 2014]

Foreign and Religious Family Law
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW

divorce principle, courts have been most concerned with orders that address
financial and custody issues, and their analysis often blends public policy
and due process considerations.
States have taken different positions as to whether and when foreign
judgments, based on different substantive legal standards, may be said to
violate a strong public policy for comity purposes. This claim has not
generally been successful with financial orders,40 but state courts do require
that foreign child custody orders must be based on a consideration of the
best interests of the child.41 Although courts apply this principle universally,
they reach different conclusions on whether to make an independent
determination of the child’s best interests when asked to give effect to a
foreign court’s order.42
Beyond the realm of international comity, arbitration by Jewish or
Islamic tribunals located within the United States has also been a flash point
in controversies over the use of religious law.43 Because all arbitration is
based on an agreement between the parties, the protections are primarily
contractual, with state or federal arbitration statutes setting the terms for
enforcement of arbitral awards. Statutory or common law public policy
norms define circumstances in which arbitration agreements should not be
enforced, and the Supreme Court has consistently declined to extend
constitutional due process into the realm of arbitration procedures.44 In
family arbitration, within the scope of statutes based on the Uniform

40. See, e.g., Leitch v. Leitch, 382 N.W.2d 448, 450 (Iowa 1986); Dart v. Dart, 568 N.W.2d
353, 356–57 (Mich. Ct. App. 1997).
41. See, e.g., Amin v. Bakhaty, 798 So.2d 75, 84–85 (La. 2001); Hosain v. Malik, 671 A.2d 988
(Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1996); Oehl v. Oehl, 272 S.E.2d 441, 443–44 (Va. 1980). See generally ABA
DESK BOOK, supra note 26, at 146–47.
42. See ABA DESK BOOK, supra note 26, at 14–15. Note that this question is now typically
addressed under UCCJEA § 105(c), 9 U.L.A. 13–14 (1997). See, e.g., Dyce v. Christie, 17 So.3d
892 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009).
43. The broad questions in this area have been well explored in the legal literature. See, e.g.,
Embracing Tradition, supra note 3, at 580–86; Unofficial Family Law, supra note 2, at 465–70;
Michael A. Helfand, Religious Arbitration and the New Multiculturalism: Negotiating Conflicting
Legal Orders, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1231 (2011). For an empirical research study addressing Muslim
dispute resolution in divorce, see MACFARLANE, supra note 2, at 155–61.
44. For example, arbitration agreements may allow parties to obtain forms of relief that would
otherwise be unavailable. E.g. Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514 U.S. 52 (1995)
(recovery of punitive damages). For a critique, see Russell D. Feingold, Mandatory Arbitration:
What Process Is Due?, 39 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 281 (2002).
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Arbitration Act,45 courts have addressed problems of duress and
unconscionability in the agreement to arbitrate,46 and have defined some
subjects—particularly child custody disputes—as subject to different
standards of review.47 When faced with agreements to arbitrate before
religious tribunals, family law courts in the United States apply these neutral
principles of arbitration and contract law.48
Public policies applied to contract enforcement are also important in the
context of marital agreements, which have been another flash point in the
debate over foreign and religious family law.49 Some opponents of the
foreign law bans have argued that the constitutional norms here should be
construed in the other direction, to favor enforcement under the Contracts
Clause.50 Current doctrine permits the states to regulate contracts when there
is a “significant and legitimate public purpose,”51 which gives the courts
wide latitude for the types of scrutiny typically applied to premarital or
separation agreements.52 It is much less clear that a complete ban on
enforcement serves a purpose.
State courts applying the comity doctrine, working with the familiar
procedural due process parameters of the United States Constitution and
other generally applicable statutory and public policy norms, have been
readily able to evaluate requests to recognize or enforce court judgments,
45. UNIF. ARBITRATION ACT, 7 U.L.A. 1 (2000).
46. See Embracing Tradition, supra note 3, at 584–85.
47. See, e.g., Fawzy v. Fawzy, 973 A.2d 347 (N.J. 2009) (custody arbitration award enforceable,
unless there is threat of harm to child); Miller v. Miller, 620 A.2d 1161 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993)
(custody arbitration award may be enforced, unless it is contrary to the best interests of the children).
Other states refuse to enforce agreements to arbitrate child custody matters. See, e.g., Kovacs v.
Kovacs, 633 A.2d 425 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1993); Glauber v. Glauber, 600 N.Y.S.2d 740, 743 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1993); Kelm v. Kelm, 749 N.E.2d 299 (Ohio 2001); Tuetken v. Tuetken, 320 S.W.3d 262
(Tenn. 2010). For a critique of this stance, see Jeffrey Haberman, Child Custody: Don’t Worry, a
Bet Din Can Get It Right, 11 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 613 (2010). Note that some states
address arbitration of custody or child support matters by statute. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS
ANN. § 600.5080 (West, Westlaw through 2014 Sess.); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 802.12(3) (West, Westlaw
through 2013).
48. See, e.g., Lang v. Levi, 16 A.3d 980 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2011); see also infra notes 94–11
and accompanying text.
49. See generally Embracing Tradition, supra note 3, at 569–77.
50. See Patel et al., supra note 8, at 23–24. See generally U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1
(Contracts Clause).
51. See Energy Reserves Grp. v. Kan. Power & Light Co., 459 U.S. 400, 411–13 (1983).
52. See generally ABA DESK BOOK, supra note 26, at 79–83.
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arbitration orders, or marital agreements based on foreign or religious law.
There are strong arguments for extending comity to foreign marriages and
divorces, to protect the parties’ reasonable expectations and avoid situations
in which a marriage is treated as valid and continuing in some places and not
in others. With respect to the ancillary consequences of marriage and
divorce—including financial matters and parental responsibility questions—
there are strong reasons to encourage private dispute resolution in its many
forms. Both of these conclusions also follow from the traditional view that
family relationships deserve a degree of deference and protection from state
interference.
II. PUBLIC POLICY AND FUNDAMENTAL FAMILY RIGHTS
Exercising the discretion accorded by the comity doctrine, states may
refuse recognition to a foreign law or judgment based on a strong public
policy that would have precluded recovery if the matter had been tried in its
own courts.53 For courts in the United States, there should be no doubt that
comity is already subject to the substantive protections for marriage and
divorce, parental decision-making, and the termination of parental rights that
the Supreme Court has identified under the Due Process Clause. Just as a
court judgment violating due process principles would not be entitled to Full
Faith and Credit or comity, a judgment that infringed an individual’s
fundamental rights should not be enforced in either a domestic or
aninternational case. A significant body of case law explores the contours of
these rights.
Supreme Court decisions have repeatedly identified the right to marry as
a fundamental right.54 In Turner v. Safley, in a context that triggered a lower
level of scrutiny, the Court acted unanimously to invalidate regulations
limiting prisoners’ ability to marry, on the basis that the restriction was “not
reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.”55 Writing for the

53. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 482(2)(d) and cmt. f (1987);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 98 cmt. g, 117 cmt. c (1971). In family law, the
public policy exception requires something more than different grounds for divorce or approaches to
division of marital assets.
54. Accord Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 383–87 (1978); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1
(1967).
55. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 99 (1987).
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Court, Justice O’Connor noted that “inmate marriages, like others, are
expressions of emotional support and public commitment;” that “the
commitment of marriage may be an exercise of religious faith as well as an
expression of personal dedication;” and that “marital status often is a
precondition to the receipt of government benefits (e.g., Social Security
benefits), property rights (e.g., tenancy by the entirety, inheritance rights),
and other, less tangible benefits (e.g., legitimation of children born out of
wedlock).”56 When faced with due process claims regarding marital
dissolution, the Court has conceptualized divorce as a counterpoint to
marriage: “the adjustment of a fundamental human relationship.” 57
Viewing marriage and divorce as fundamental rights, the constitutional
arguments seem to line up against the foreign law bans. To the extent that
proponents of these bans reference practices such as polygamy, child
marriage, and divorce by repudiation, these are already prohibited by state
laws.58 Rules that deny legal recognition of foreign marriages or divorces
risk depriving individuals of the many basic and important rights that depend
on family status, and should, accordingly, be justified by some compelling
governmental interest. Based on cases such as Turner, it seems unlikely that
the generalized fears behind the foreign laws bans could meet this standard.59
Parent-child relationships also give rise to fundamental rights,60 but
these are balanced against the state’s compelling interest in protecting
children from harm.61 The Supreme Court requires special protections for
parents in cases involving termination of parental rights,62 and deference to a
fit parent’s decision-making regarding her child’s visits with extended
family members.63 The Supreme Court has been more ambivalent in its

56. Id. at 95–96.
57. Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 383 (1971); cf. Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393 (1975).
See generally Family Law Federalism, supra note 29, at 424–28.
58. See generally Embracing Tradition, supra note 3, at 567–69.
59. See also Patel et al., supra note 8.
60. E.g., Pierce v. Soc’y of the Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390
(1923).
61. See Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 164–70 (1944). Given this balancing act, the
Supreme Court’s more recent decisions are best characterized as imposing an intermediate level of
scrutiny. See David D. Meyer, The Constitutional Rights of Non-Custodial Parents, 34 HOFSTRA L.
REV. 1461 (2006).
62. See e.g., M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102 (1996); Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982).
63. Accord Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000).
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protection of the parental rights for unwed fathers,64 and courts have
generally declined to extend the “fundamental rights” framework to custody
litigation between a child’s parents.65 As a constitutional matter, therefore,
the best interests of the child test provides sufficient protection, except in
cases that also involve claims of discrimination based on race or gender.
In general, therefore, fundamental parental rights are not undermined by
the usual comity analysis, which asks whether the tribunal entered an order
consistent with the best interests of the child. For a custody determination
made by a foreign court or religious arbitration tribunal, however, there are
other concerns—particularly when the other legal system draws substantive
or procedural distinctions between the parental rights of fathers and mothers.
Similarly, laws that base child custody or support rights on race, religion, or
birth status would trigger serious constitutional equality questions.
III. EQUAL PROTECTION AND THE FAMILY
The prohibition of laws or practices that discriminate on the basis of
race or other protected grounds—such as religion or national origin—stands
at the core of equal protection. Laws barring interracial marriages have been
unconstitutional throughout the country since Loving v. Virginia,66 and the
Supreme Court concluded in Palmore v. Sidoti that a child custody
determination based on the race of the parties was similarly
unconstitutional.67 A judgment based explicitly on the parties’ race or
ethnicity would clearly be unenforceable in the United States.68
Classifications based on gender were once pervasive in American family
law, with its roots in the English ecclesiastical and common law, including
the law of marriage, divorce, family property and parental rights and
responsibilities. Similar principles were carried over into the emerging
public structures that regulate and support families, such as federal income
64. Compare Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972), and Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380
(1979), with Lehr v. Robertsen, 463 U.S. 248 (1983), and Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53 (2001).
65. Cf. Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 3 (2004) (rejecting noncustodial
parent’s assertion of fundamental parental right to determine child’s schooling). See generally
Meyer, supra note 61 (discussing noncustodial parents’ rights).
66. 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
67. 466 U.S. 429 (1984).
68. Rulings based on religious considerations or membership would more likely be treated as
raising First Amendment questions. See infra Part IV.

1040

[Vol. 41: 1029, 2014]

Foreign and Religious Family Law
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW

tax and the Social Security program. Since the 1970s, however, the Supreme
Court has required that legislative classifications based on gender or marital
status have a direct and substantial relationship to some important
governmental purpose, and may not simply reflect “mechanical application
of traditional, often inaccurate assumptions about the proper roles of men
and women.”69 In family law, these rulings have required that husbands and
wives have the same rights with regard to alimony,70 that sons and daughters
have the same rights to financial support,71 and that fathers and mothers have
the same parental rights with respect to children they have both raised.72
Given the distinct legal positions of husbands and wives under Jewish
and Islamic law, gender inequality has been the central issue for courts and
commentators debating family law pluralism.73 Their concern is that women
face religious and communal pressure to agree to procedural and substantive
rules that will be unfair in comparison to what the secular law provides.74
Women who wish to live their lives according to different moral or religious
principles, clearly have a right to forego other legal remedies that might
otherwise be available. When couples bring their agreements or arbitration
awards to secular courts as the basis for obtaining a civil divorce decree,
however, those courts appropriately consider claims of unfairness—
including claims of gender bias.75
Equality principles have also led the Supreme Court to strike most
statutes that discriminate between children born to married or unmarried
parents, insuring for example that they must have the same rights to parental
69. Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 726 (1982).
70. Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268 (1979) (striking Alabama statute under which husbands, but not
wives, could be ordered to pay alimony).
71. Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7, 17–18 (1975) (striking Utah statute under which girls
reached majority at 18 and boys at 21).
72. Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380 (1979). But see Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53, 73 (2001)
(sustaining federal statute making it more difficult for child born abroad to claim United States
citizenship through an unmarried father than an unmarried mother). Many cases have explored the
rights of unmarried fathers, starting with Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
73. E.g., Linda C. McClain, Marriage Pluralism in the United States: On Civil and Religious
Jurisdiction and the Demands of Equal Citizenship, in MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE IN A
MULTICULTURAL CONTEXT: MULTI-TIERED MARRIAGE AND THE BOUNDARIES OF CIVIL LAW AND
RELIGION, supra note 7, at 309; Shachar, supra note 17; Julia Halloran McLaughlin, Taking Religion
Out of Civil Divorce, 65 RUTGERS L. REV. 395 (2013).
74. Accord Shachar, supra note 17, at 354.
75. See, e.g., Aleem v. Aleem, 947 A.2d 489, 501–02 (Md. 2008).
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support.76 This presents a notable conflict with religious legal systems,
which generally refuse to recognize father–child relationships formed
outside the marital context.
IV. FAMILIES AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT
The most difficult challenges for secular state courts faced with
questions of religious law or practice arise under the First Amendment
Religion Clauses. While the constitutional text has been understood to
protect minority religious beliefs, the Supreme Court’s ruling in Reynolds v.
United States rejected the claim that religious practices such as polygamy
should be protected.77 Contemporary doctrine holds that states cannot target
or prefer a particular religion, but may enact laws that are neutral and
generally applicable—even if these constrain or penalize religious
practices.78
The neutrality requirement does important work in marriage law. To the
extent that secular American family laws recognize the authority of religious
clergy or groups to solemnize marriages, all clergy or groups must have the
same authority.79 If some premarital or marital agreements are enforced by
the courts, marital agreements that include religious terms should also be
enforced—subject to scrutiny based on the same neutral and general
principles applied to similar agreements with no religious terms. When
presented with agreements for mahr, for example, state courts appropriately
consider contract defenses—including, rules of procedural and substantive
unconscionability.80 One important aspect of the Supreme Court’s First
Amendment doctrine is that the state governments should avoid making
76. E.g., Mills v. Habluetzel, 456 U.S. 91 (1982); Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S. 535 (1973); Levy v.
Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1971). Here as well, the Court has applied intermediate scrutiny, see
Nguyenv. INS, 533 U.S. 53, 60 (2001).
77. 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
78. See, e.g., Emp’t. Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990); cf. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye,
Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993); Brown v. Buhman, 947 F. Supp. 2d 1170 (D. Utah
2013) (holding that facially neutral polygamous cohabitation law was not neutral in application and
enforcement). Applying this framework, the direct ban on reference to sharia law was clearly
unconstitutional, because it targeted a particular religion. See supra note 9, and accompanying text.
79. See, e.g., Persad v. Balram, 724 N.Y.S.2d 560 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2001).
80. E.g., Odatalla v. Odatalla, 810 A.2d 93 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 2002); see Nathan B.
Oman, How to Judge Shari’a Contracts: A Guide to Islamic Marriage Agreements in American
Courts, 2011 UTAH L. REV. 287 (2011); see also Embracing Tradition, supra note 3, at 569–90.
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individualized assessments of religious conduct,81 and this principle is also
important to courts determining whether it is possible to enforce a marital
agreement that originates in a religious setting.82
Some courts apply a higher level of scrutiny to cases involving so-called
hybrid rights, when a free exercise claim relates to another area protected by
the Constitution. In Wisconsin v. Yoder, the religious freedom claim was
recognized in combination with the fundamental right of parents to make
important decisions regarding their children’s upbringing.83 Similarly, laws
that appeared to be neutral and generally applicable, but which undermined
the fundamental right to marry on religious grounds might fall within the
scope of Yoder. These principles are less likely to be useful in custody or
other disputes between parents, where the court cannot decide between
religious views or prefer one parent’s religion over the other’s.84
Walking a fine line between the Free Exercise and Establishment
Clauses, state courts have sometimes considered religion as a factor deciding
custody disputes, particularly when there is evidence of the child’s religious
beliefs and needs,85 or evidence that a parent’s religiously motivated
practices have had a negative effect on the child’s best interests.86 Without
this sort of evidence, however, courts are clear that parental responsibility
issues may not be determined on the basis of religious considerations.87
Similarly, in the context of divorce, state courts cannot favor one point
of view when two spouses may have different religious views regarding
divorce.88 If members of a couple disagree over whether to cooperate in
81. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 882–84 (discussing claims for unemployment compensation after
discharge).
82. E.g., Victor v. Victor, 866 P.2d 899 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1993); Shaban v. Shaban, 105 Cal. Rptr.
2d 863 (Ct. App. 2001); Mayer-Kolker v. Kolker, 819 A.2d 17 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2003).
83. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
84. E.g., Kendall v. Kendall, 687 N.E.2d 1228 (Mass. 1997); Sagar v. Sagar, 781 N.E.2d 54
(Mass. App. Ct. 2003).
85. Bonjour v. Bonjour, 592 P.2d 1233 (Alaska 1979).
86. Kendall, 687 N.E.2d 1228.
87. E.g., Harrison v. Tauheed, 256 P.3d 851 (Kan. 2011); Katz v. Katz, 966 N.Y.S.2d 346 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 2013), Shepp v. Shepp, 906 A.2d 1165 (Pa. 2006); see also Jeffrey Shulman, What Yoder
Wrought: Religious Disparagement, Parental Alienation and the Best Interests of the Child, 53
VILL. L. REV. 173 (2008).
88. See Sharma v. Sharma, 667 P.2d 395 (Kan. Ct. App. 1983); Wikoski v. Wikoski, 513 A.2d
986 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986); Waite v. Waite, 150 S.W.3d 797, 801 (Tex. Ct. App. 2004); Trickey v.
Trickey, 642 S.W.2d 47 (Tex. Ct. App. 1982).
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religious proceedings or rituals to terminate their marriage, the state courts
cannot order the recalcitrant member to participate.89 This presents a
particularly significant problem for observant Jewish women, who are
unable to marry again without a get, or religious divorce.90 The structural
differences between the positions of husbands and wives, under religious
law, create opportunities for strategic or abusive conduct that carries over
into secular divorce proceedings.91 Understanding that secular courts cannot
address this issue directly, significant creativity has been brought to the
effort to find a solution to the problem.92 Jewish communities have come up
with two significant responses: efforts to have legislatures enact get laws as
a device to coordinate secular and religious divorce proceedings,93 and the
use of arbitration agreements to confer authority on a religious tribunal.94
In practice, New York’s get laws have prompted a cooperative process
between the rabbinic arbitration tribunals and the civil courts that has
benefitted women who wish to harmonize their civil and religious family
status.95 The process has helped to reduce the opportunities for strategic
89. See Victor v. Victor, 866 P.2d 899 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1993); Aflalo v. Aflalo, 685 A.2d 523
(N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1996). But see Embracing Tradition, supra note 3, at 579 (stating that
“courts have relied on contract theories as a basis for ordering a recalcitrant spouse to appear before
the bet din to deliver or accept a get”).
90. See Embracing Tradition, supra note 3, at 578–86; see also Michael J. Broyde, New York’s
Regulation of Jewish Marriage: Covenant, Contract, or Statute?, in MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE IN A
MULTICULTURAL CONTEXT: MULTI-TIERED MARRIAGE AND THE BOUNDARIES OF CIVIL LAW AND
RELIGION, supra note 7, at 138.
91. See Embracing Tradition, supra note 3, at 578–86.
92. See id.; Unofficial Family Law, supra note 2, at 470–72.
93. See Embracing Tradition, supra note 3, at 578–86. In the debate over multicultural
accommodation, get laws represent the opposite end of the spectrum from the new foreign law bans.
See id. In the United States, New York is the only state with get legislation. See id.; see also N.Y.
DOM. REL. LAW § 236(B)(5)(h), (B)(6)(d) (McKinney, Westlaw through L.2014, chapters 1 to 3)
(enacted 1962); N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 253 (McKinney, Westlaw through L.2014, chapters 1 to 3)
(enacted 1983); Broyde, supra note 90, at 148–61. Get legislation was enacted in the United
Kingdom in 2002. See Divorce (Religious Marriages) Act 2002, c. 27 (Eng.). See also Embracing
Tradition, supra note 3, at 581 n.257
94. See Embracing Tradition, supra note 3, at 578–86. Arbitration agreements may also prove
useful for Muslim communities. See id. at 575–77; see also Mohammad H. Fadel, Political
Liberalism, Islamic Family Law, and Family Law Pluralism, in MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE IN A
MULTICULTURAL CONTEXT: MULTI-TIERED MARRIAGE AND THE BOUNDARIES OF CIVIL LAW AND
RELIGION, supra note 7, at 164, 193–96; cf. Broyde, supra note 90, at 154 n.67 (noting the question
of whether New York’s get statute might apply to Islamic marriages (citations omitted)).
95. See Embracing Tradition, supra note 3, at 582–83; see also Broyde, supra note 90.
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behavior between individuals who both intend to remain within the religious
community.96 If one member of a couple left the community and objected to
the procedure—and the statute—on First Amendment grounds, it could face
a serious establishment and free exercise challenge.97 Beyond New York,
where there are no get laws, state courts rely on the neutral principles of
contract and arbitration law to review agreements to arbitrate before
religious tribunals, as well as the outcomes of those proceedings.98 In this
context, courts also recognize clearly the constraints under the First
Amendment on this review process.99
V. CONCLUSION
For international family law cases—including those in which a foreign
court applied Islamic or Jewish law—the ordinary comity framework
incorporates important protections established by constitutional law and
public policy. In domestic cases, neutral principles of contract and
arbitration law work reasonably well for couples and families who anticipate
and plan for private ordering and dispute resolution in a religious law
framework.100 While it is clear that American courts must avoid direct
interpretation or application of religious law, the traditional approach to both
comity and contract do not require state courts to reject a judgment or
agreement based on different substantive laws. This is precisely the point of
both the comity doctrine and the move toward greater private ordering in
family law.
The biggest challenge, both conceptually and practically, comes in
transnational cases involving families with ties to multiple countries and
legal systems over time. For example, consider a couple who marry abroad
and relocate to the United States.101 How much of the legal system from the
country where they were married should follow them to the United States,

96. See Embracing Tradition, supra note 3, at 583.
97. Cf. In re Marriage of Goldman, 554 N.E.2d 1016, 1025–26 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990) (Johnson, J.,
dissenting); Embracing Tradition, supra note 3, at 579–80.
98. See Embracing Tradition, supra note 3, at 578–86.
99. E.g., Lang v. Levi, 16 A.3d 980 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2011).
100. See Broyde, supra note 90, at 147–48 (noting that couples may not anticipate and plan ahead
for these problems at the time of their marriage).
101. E.g., Shaban v. Shaban, 105 Cal. Rptr. 2d 863 (Ct. App. 2001).
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and for how long? How can a court determine whether they intended to be
governed in the future by the law under which they were married, rather than
the law of the place where they have relocated? How far should husband or
wife be permitted to forum shop by moving between the couple’s country of
origin and the place where they have established domicile, residence, or
citizenship? What if the reason for seeking a religious divorce in the United
States is to assure that their status will be recognized, if one or both of them
return to their home country?102
There are similar challenges in cases involving families who are
“transnational” in the sense that they span different countries and legal
systems in a single moment in time. For example, a husband and father may
relocate to the United States, and choose not to bring his wife and
children.103 Or a family may try living in the United States together, and
some family members may decide to return to their original home country.
Or a wife may come to the United States and seek the benefit of more
generous family law rules.104 What laws should be applied to the family
disputes that follow? How quickly should our laws and policies begin to
override those of the country where the family began? Should the family
members living abroad have the same opportunity to forum shop between
the two legal systems as the family members living in the United States?105
These problems extend beyond the realm of family law. We have begun
to recognize that failure to protect family members from serious domestic
violence is a type of persecution that may be a basis for refugee status.
Should foreign citizens be able to seek asylum on the basis of foreign laws
that define important family status or legal rights on the basis of gender or
legitimacy of birth?
In these circumstances, we have moved beyond the law of comity and
the ordinary framework of contract law. Courts are understandably reluctant
to treat the comity doctrine or a marital agreement like a permanent forum
selection choice of law trump card. The questions in these cases are also not
102. Cf. MACFARLANE, supra note 2, at 227–31 (noting particular difficulties surrounding
divorce for Muslim families in transnational cases). As Mohammad Fadel notes, a judgment from
an Islamic court is necessary to establish a divorced woman’s legal and moral entitlements within
the Muslim community. Fadel, supra note 94, at 191.
103. E.g., Chaudry v. Chaudry, 388 A.2d 1000 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1978).
104. E.g., Hosain v. Malik, 671 A.2d 988 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1996).
105. E.g., Amin v. Bakhaty, 798 So.2d 75, 84-85 (La. 2001).
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constitutional, except in the broader sense of how we understand the process
by which people become members of our political and legal community.
This may suggest a more sympathetic double reading of the recent strain of
foreign law statutes as legally misguided and problematic on one hand, and
on the other as a strong and affirmative statement of the desire to embrace
and include all families present within our borders in the broader legal
institutions that shape and define our society.
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